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Marina Lifshits 
MIGRATION IN THE GLOBAL WORLD: ECONOMICAL AND 
DEMOGRAPHICAL ROLES AND PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIA 
In accordance with the main objective for demographic development 
declared in the Demographic Policy Concept of the Russian Federation until 2025, 
population decline is to be compensated by net migration (Demographic Policy 
Concept 2007).  
However, not every goal is achievable for the migration policy. As Russia is 
part-and-parcel of the global world, it is influenced by certain principles, which 
determine scale and direction of the world migration flows.  
Additionally, according to Alfred Sauvy, the size of population is important 
for despotic regimes striving for strengthening of the power, while for a democratic 
country living standard of population will be most important (Sauvy 1977, v.1, p. 
31). 
Taking the above considerations into account the author of this paper has 
taken to the econometric analysis of the ROSSTAT and World Bank data to 
answer the following questions: (1) Provided that age structure of the population is 
influenced by migration, can migration influence upon living standards too, and to 
what extend?  (2) What factors determine the volumes and direction of the world 
migration flows? (3) For what reasons net migration to Russia from various post-
Soviet countries is that different? (4) What are the prospects of net migration to 
Russia? (5) What kind of migration policy does Russia need? 
1. Influence of migration upon living standards improvement via influence 
upon the age structure of population 
It is well known that younger labour-age people are the most inclined to 
migration. With the population ageing trend, this feature of the migration flows is 
getting more and more important. 
The below equation shows the influence produced by the age structure of 
population upon growth of living standards (GLS) in the world countries: 
GLSC,T = b0 + b1 * REDWALS + b2 * PM(15-39) + b3 * PM(40-64) + εC,T ,      (1) 
where GLSC,T – growth of living standards (i.e. GDP per capita growth, measured 
in constant price terms), % for 19 years, in the country C for the period of time T 
(totally, 7 periods: 1961-1979, 1966-1984, 1971-1989, 1976-1994, 1981-1999, 
1986-2004 and 1991-2009);  
REDWALS – rate of economic development to the world average level, i. e. GDP 
per capita rate at purchasing-power parity in the country to the world average level, 
%; at the beginning of the period (lettered with S); 
PM(15-39)  и  PM(40-64) – average share of the specified age group of the 
population, %, within the period (lettered with  M); 
bk – variable held constant; 
εC,T  – random quantity, the balance of equation. 
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The Table 1 shows  bk and other factors of the equation (1) for two groups of 
observations satisfying the following conditions: 
A) Migration balance is positive for the current period: MBT>0; share of 
population of the 65+ age group at the beginning of period is bounded below: 
PS(65+)>3,5%; 20<REDWAL<450;  
B) PS(65+)>3,5%; Migration balance is positive for a long time: MBT>0; MBT-5>0; 
MBT-10>0; MBT-15>0; MBT-20>0; REDWAL>20. 
 
Table 1 
Factors bk and other parameters of the Model 1 for two groups of observations  
Sample A B 
Factors  bk   Std. Error 
1)
 bk   Std. Error 
Constant –317,5 48,3 –418,7 54,9 
REDWAL –0,191  0,032 –0,035 0,033 
PM(15-39)   8,18 1,06 9,66 1,12 
PM(40-64) 4,46 0,74 3,99 0,82 
Other parameters of the model and sample 
Number of observations 201 71 
R
2
 0,336 0,553 
GLS, mean   60,5 48,8 
REDWAL, mean 247,3 306,2 
PS (65+), mean 9,50 10,83 
Estimated on the basis of World Bank data 
Note: 1) standard error – standard deviation of the coefficient as a random variable 
The sampling A does not include the most rich and most poor countries, and 
it is closer to Russia in terms of the mean parameters PS(65+) and REDWAL; age 
structure of population and the current level of economic development determine 
approximately one third of the variation of the dependent variable (R
2
=0,34). Also, 
the REDWAL provides a considerable negative influence – it is easier to run after, 
than to go ahead. 
Rich and aging countries being attractive for migrants for a long time 
predominate in the sampling B, and age structure of population here explains 
approx. 55% of the GLS variation, as the other risks influence was minimal in 
these countries during the given periods of time. 
The probable increase in living standards in Russia for the future prospect 
may be calculated using the Model 1.A parameters and the average variant of the 
ROSSTAT demographic prognosis till 2030 (Table 2). 
Table 2 
Probable increase in living standards in Russia, % 
 Probable increase in living standards, % 
Period Mean  
Spread of values with 
probability 50% 
Spread of values with 
probability 95% 
Min Max min max 
2010-2028, for the  19 years 83,4 57,2 109,6 6,4 160,5 
Annual average: 
2010-2028 3,24 2,41 3,97 0,33 5,17 
2010-2014 3,96 3,23 4,61 1,48 5,69 
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2015-2019 3,29 2,46 4,01 0,39 5,20 
2020-2024 2,63 1,69 3,43 -0,76 4,73 
2025-2029 2,14 1,11 3,01 -1,68 4,40 
A considerable spread of the probable values for GLS in the Table is 
connected with the fact that increase in living standards is influenced not only by 
the variables included into equation 1, but also by many other factors. Among 
those are energy costs, peculiarities of taxation, level of corruption, and political 
risks. Thus, if the GDP per capita in constant prices will increase less than by 80% 
between 2010 and 2028, it will not be a result of poor demographic situation, but, 
rather, ineffective public administration system.  
Nevertheless, the percentage of the labour-age population in Russia in 2011-
2028 will be going down, and this may bring about a lower growth rate of living 
standards. Many other countries with low birth rate will be in a similar situation. 
Globally, percentage of children aged 0-14 in 2009 was lower in comparison with 
2000. It means the number of youth in the world will not show any growth in the 
2020s. Consequently, the global competition for the labor resources will gain 
strength. 
An actual question within this context is: Could the net migration in Russia 
exceed the figures built into the ROSSTAT average forecast? And what will it be 
depending upon? To find an answer, let us consider the factors influencing 
volumes and directions of the world migration flows.  
2. Net migration factors in the countries of the world 
Migration balance in a certain country may be whether positive, or negative, 
depending first of all upon two following factors: comparative level of economic 
development, and economic growth:  
NMR C,T = –57,6 + 0,216*REDWALM + 6,65*EGM + εC,T ;  R
2
=0,37;    (2) 
                  (4,3)   (0,015)                        (0,93) 
where NMR C,T  – net migration rate in a country C for the period of time T (in 
general, 3 periods of time: 1981-1995, 1986-2000 and 1991-2005) per 10,000 
population annually; 163 countries, 421 observations; 
EGM  – economic growth, %, annual average for the period; 
the digits in brackets under the coefficients are – standard errors. 
Net migration rate in the countries with positive migration balance (80 
countries, 178 observations) for the same above-mentioned 3 periods of time is for 
40% determined by factors in the empirically found formula:\ 
NMR C,T = 62,9 + 0,183*REDWALM + 3,92*EGM  – 
     (13,1)   (0,019)                        (1,24) 
 
                         –3,17* PM(40-64) –1,64*U – 0,132* PM  + εC,T,            (3) 
                                  (0,56)                      (0,56)        (0,075) 
where U – change in the percent share of the urban population for the period; it 
enters into the equation with the minus sign, because in the countries with 
completed urbanization the influx of unskilled foreign workers is required 
(Massey, 2007, pp. 149-152); 
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PM – the country population size, average for the period, M people. Influence is 
negative, as the countries with numerous populations have more possibilities to 
satisfy manpower demand due to the internal migration. 
Share of the people aged 40-64 also enters into the equation with negative sign, as 
labour migrants partially return home after work. 
Thus, REDWAL provides the most significant influence upon migratory 
attractiveness of a country, as compared with all other factors of the Model (3). 
NMR in the countries with a negative migration balance (108 countries, 239 
observations) is determined, for 45%, by factors in the following equation: 
NMR C,T = 80,4 + 0,163*REDWALM + 6,49*EGM  – 
                                          (38,1)   (0,038)                         (0,95) 
 
–3,65 * PM(15-39) + 12,63* LN(PM) –7,86* LN(PDM) + εC,T ,            (4) 
          (0,97)                          (1,22)                  (1,81) 
where PDM  – population density in the country of origin, average for the period, 
people per km
2
. The variable enters into the equation with minus sign, i.e. high 
density of population is one of the ejecting factors. Nevertheless, lower density of 
population is not a factor of attraction for migrants. 
Population size, on the contrary, enters into the equation (4) with positive 
sign: the higher the population size, the lower migration loss is. It may be 
explained by the fact the countries with large size of population have more 
opportunities to improve their living standards due to the internal migration. The 
share of young labour-age people is with minus sign in the equation (4), as 
tendency for migration is higher among the younger aged people.  
If net migration to Russia between 1991-2010 fits to the formula 2, it will be 
negative (see Table 3). In reality Russia has received a large inflow of migrants 
due to wide repatriation followed by labour migration from post-Soviet countries. 
In addition, outflow from the country is restrained by the possibility of people to 
improve their own living conditions via internal migration.  
Table 3 
Actual net migration to Russia compared to the calculations by Model 2  
Period 
Net migration to Russia 
Calculated by Model 2 
Actual, thous. people for 
the period CMG 
thous. people  
for the period 
1991-1995 -84,8 -6228 2560,3 
1996-2000 -24,3 -1774 2088,5 
2001-2005 9,05 654 827,2 
2006-2010 -3,39 -241 1075,5 
2011-2015* 1,03 73 … 
2016-2020* -0,17 -12 … 
2021-2025* -2,23 -153 … 
2026-2030* -4,19 -281 … 
* where economic growth meets the mean values from the Table 2. 
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As REDWAL in Russia is not so high in comparison with other countries 
receiving migrants, Russia in the future cannot expect big volumes of net migration 
from the countries other than post-Soviet ones. China may be an only exception. 
3. Migration gain prospects in Russia 
There are three indices characterizing the results of international migration 
of population in Russia, see Table 4:  
1) Official data published by ROSSTAT; according to these data the main 
migration donors for Russia are the 11 post-Soviet countries, and China; 
2) The balance of foreign citizens crossing the Russian borders (this index is the 
most changeable and sensitive to the economic situation); 
3) The number of foreign citizens legally working in Russia.  
Table 4 
International migration to Russia: Results, thous. people 
 Balance of migration (by source of 
data) per a year Legal work  
of foreign citizens  RF Frontier 
services * 
ROSSTAT 
Country of origin, or 
citizenship 
2007-
2008 
2009 
2007-
2009 
2010 2008 2009 2010 
Total  1491,5 371,3 243,2 158,1 2425,9 2223,6 1640,8 
Uzbekistan 235,2 -111,8 45,5 23,3 642,7 666,3 511,5 
Ukraine 526,3 427,5 40,4 21,2 245,3 205,3 167,3 
Kazakhstan 175,2 84,5 31,4 20,5 10,4 11,2 8,3 
Kyrgyz Rep. 96,2 21,6 23,3 20,3 184,6 156,1 117,7 
Armenia 15,6 8,2 33,0 19,2 100,1 82,0 59,8 
Tajikistan 115,8 -68,1 21,1 17,5 391,4 359,2 268,6 
Azerbaijan 28,3 -27,4 21,1 13,4 76,3 60,7 40,3 
Moldova 132,1 42,2 14,7 11,2 122,0 101,9 72,2 
Georgia -6,2 1,3 8,4 4,8 4,2 3,2 … 
Turkmenistan 6,4 -2,3 4,0 2,2 3,1 2,4 1,2 
Belarus 10,9 20,4 1,9 2,0 … … … 
China 23,8 -17,2 1,2 1,1 281,7 269,9 186,5 
Vietnam 10,6 -11,5 0,8 … 95,2 97,5 46,0 
Turkey 0,9 -5,6 0,3 … 130,5 77,2 45,7 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 1,8 -0,1 0,07 … 34,9 37,7 36,5 
Other 118,6 9,6 -4,0 1,4 103,5 93 79,2 
Sources of data: Size and Migration of the RF Population, ROSSTAT, 2008-2010; Labour and 
Employment in Russia, ROSSTAT, 2009; www.gks.ru 
*The RF Frontier Service.  
Dynamics of all the three indices is influenced upon by circumstances of 2 
kinds – (1) objective laws and (2) regulations imposed by the government. Official 
data on migration of population published by ROSSTAT to a considerable degree 
depend upon changes in the rules of statistical account, and of granting the Russian 
citizenship. These indices also are under influence of temporary residence 
permission quotas. Only the migrants with such permission are registered by 
ROSSTAT as those “arrived to Russia”, however, many of them have been 
actually staying in the RF for more than one year. The balance of citizens of the 
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Ukraine, Moldova and Kazakhstan crossing the Russian border might be 
exaggerated (Fig. 1): because they may avoid meeting with border services on the 
way home, if they stayed longer than it is legally permitted. As for the citizens of 
other countries, this index is closer to the reality, but it depends on the possibility 
of legal employment in Russia. The number of legally employed foreigners 
depends on their net inflow, on obtaining Russian citizenship, and on the State-
established quotas for attracting foreign manpower; excluding the citizens of 
Belarus working on the equal terms with the Russians (but the number of them is 
unknown). Thus, net migration only from Belarus has increased in 2009, in 
accordance with the data of Frontier Service (FS). 
Fig. 1. Balance of foreign citizens crossing the border of Russian Federation 
 
Source: Size and Migration of the RF population, Moscow, ROSSTAT, 2004-2010. 
On the whole, the last data for the three indices are lower, as compared to 
the previous years. In addition to the economic crisis and restrictions from the part 
of the State, this decline has been caused by certain objective laws.  These laws 
have been revealed by the author with the help of econometric analysis of factors 
of net migration from the post-Soviet countries (Lifshits 2010, 2011). 
In the 1990-s, the major factors of the migration gain in Russia were as 
follows: (1) the share of non-titular ethnic group of population and (2) economic 
collapse in the countries of origin; most of the migrants were returning home at 
that time. In the 2000s, labour migration steps up and as a consequence, the 
influence of the share of youth in the population of countries of origin and ethnic-
migration nets in Russia has increased.  
Influence of the economic growth in the countries of origin remains high, 
that is why growth of net migration to Russia in 2008-2009 has been caused, first 
of all, by the economic crisis in the number of post-Soviet countries. 
Influence of the ethnic-migration nets, on the contrary, starts reducing as the 
cumulative net migration from certain post-Soviet countries (Kazakhstan, 
Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan) has already run a great value in comparison with 
size of population of the countries of origin. 
 Net migration from several countries is reducing (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan) as living standards there grow faster than in Russia (Fig. 2). 
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Fig. 2. Rate of economic development to the World average level (REDWAL) in the post-
Soviet countries and in China 
 
Sources: World Bank, IMF. 
Demographic limitations will also provide negative influence upon the dynamics 
of net migration to Russia, as the number of youth in the countries of origin will go 
down (Fig. 3 and 4), and it has already started to reduce in some countries 
(Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova). One more fact to be taken into account - of late, the 
Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and, probably, Turkmenistan, are the 
post-Soviet countries with a positive migration balance as well. 
Fig. 3. Number of children of 0-14 in the 12 post-Soviet countries, 1960-2009. 
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Source of data: World Bank, 2010. 
 
Fig. 4. Number of people aged 15-44, born in the 12 post-Soviet countries. 
 
Calculated on the basis of World Bank data. 
Econometric analysis has revealed a considerable influence upon labour 
migration of the difference between the death rates of adults, especially men, in the 
country of origin and in Russia. In this respect, the situation in Russia is very 
complicated, and the most vulnerable category of population (except homeless) is 
temporary labour migrants, who perish most often for various reasons, like 
violence, on-the-job traumatism, poor living conditions and lack of medical care. 
Factor of ageing of population in the future may inhibit the growth of net 
migration: some part of the older-aged labour migrants will want to go home 
having finished their work in Russia, even those who has obtained Russian 
citizenship. 
Visa system negatively influences upon the dynamics of net migration from 
Turkmenistan and Georgia; and from Uzbekistan – the migrants have certain 
problems after returning home if they have obtained Russian citizenship (as the 
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Uzbek migrants say). This circumstance proves again, that most migrants do not 
want to stay in Russia forever. 
Thus, there are no factors able to promote increase of the migration gain of 
the resident population of Russia through the exchange with post-Soviet countries, 
considered in a long-term perspective.  
For the last 20 years migration links of Russia with countries outside the 
post-Soviet territory have been also developing. But, Russia is only one direction 
for migration, and not the most attractive one. That is why other countries are 
unable to compensate for the reduced net migration from post-Soviet countries. 
China may be an only possible exception.  
Dynamics of migration from China has shown a weak and unstable tendency 
for growth. 
One of the deterring circumstances is migration policy of Russia, caused by 
the concerns of the territorial integrity of the country. But there are other deterring 
factors as well. Firstly, standard of living in China grows faster than in Russia. 
Secondly, the number of Chinese youth aged 15-39 goes down since 2006. 
Probably, for this reason the aggregate net migration outflow from China in the 
second half of the 2000s was less than in the first half, amounted at 1,731,080; 
while in the first half of the 2000s it was 2,058,276 (according to WB data). And it 
is expected that in 2012 number of population aged 35-49 will start to decrease in 
China. Thirdly, there are great opportunities for internal migration in China. 
Fourthly, Russia is not among the most attractive directions for migration, from the 
point of view of quality of life, especially for the youth. That is why people aged 
35-49 are currently prevailing in the migration gain from China. On the other hand, 
there are several factors in favour of Russia, among those geographic 
neighborhood, various rates of men and women at the matrimonial market of China 
and Russia, and emerged migration ties.  
5. Summary for policy making 
If migration is to be considered only as a method of influence upon age 
structure of population, the temporary, non-resident migration will be an ideal 
variant of migration; the labour migrants are sui generis ever-young and non-aging 
community in the population of the receiving country. On the other hand, 
knowledge and experience play nowadays a considerable role in the world, so the 
competition for highly skilled migrants grows now, and Russia gives way to more 
developed countries. 
High economic growth in Russia might improve the migration attractiveness 
of the country and attract an inflow of migrants (both permanent and temporary 
ones). This, in turn, will stimulate growth of living standards. At the same time, 
quite an opposite situation is equally possible as well. If the state will again restrict 
legal employment of the labour migrants, like in 2009-2010, soon it will lead to 
intensified reduction of the percentage of population aged 15-64, to negatively 
influence upon growth of living standards. Then Russia will quickly lose its 
migration attractiveness, and this vicious circle may result in a complicated 
economic situation, opening way to the political earthquakes. 
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The upcoming reduction in size of labour-age population shall not obligatory 
result in serious problems, as the competitive market economy is characterized by 
a higher adaptive capability. But, unfortunately, high level of corruption in Russia 
and ineffective judiciary system create noncompetitive market environment. This 
is the main threat to the future of Russia. It is necessary to start with introducing 
honest elections in the country – it is known, the best antidote for corruption is 
replacement of political authority, alternativeness as a matter of principle. 
The regions shall be given the right to make a final decision (in the local 
legislative assemblies, via open discussion) regarding following issues: how many 
and what kind of migrants could be received and attracted to work in the region; on 
what terms; and, could only the  migrants with permits for work in this region be 
able to work here. The level of xenophobia will decrease then, and migration 
policy will become a locomotive of movement towards democracy and developed 
civil society. 
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